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THE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT:
PINNING DOWN PRODUCTS LAW
LARRY A. RIBSTEIN*

T

HE FOLLOWING student papers deal with the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act.' The purpose of this brief foreword is
to provide a history, a very general critical overview and some
comments on the future of the UPLA which will serve as a context for the much more elaborate treatment by these papers of specific aspects of the UPLA.
A HISTORICAL

NOTE

The first step toward the preparation of the UPLA was the creation by the President's Economic Policy Board of the Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability in April, 1976, amid widespread
dissatisfaction of manufacturers with increased rates and decreased
availability of product liability insurance.! After a comprehensive
study of manufacturing practices, insurance and tort law, the Task
Force released a preliminary report on January 4, 1977,' and a
Final Report on November 1, 1977.' The Task Force substantiated
the existence of the insurance problems cited by the manufacturers,
but found something less than a crisis.' It identified three major
causes of these problems: (1) insurance rate-making procedures;
* A.B., 1968, Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1972, University of Chicago

Law School; Associate Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School, Macon,
Georgia; currently a Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University School of Law.
IHereinafter referred to as the "UPLA." The UPLA, together with the drafters'
section-by-section analysis, has been published by the Department of Commerce,
in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
2FED. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT, 1-1

(1977) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT. The Federal Interagency Task
Force on Products Liability will be hereinafter referred to as the "Task Force"].
3 TASK FORCE, BRIEFING REPORT (1977).
4 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-21-1-31.
5 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at VI-52-VI-56.
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(2) uncertainties in tort law; and (3) unsafe manufacturing practices.'
On February 24, 1978, the Department of Commerce (DOC)
forwarded to the White House a discussion of various options for the

resolution of the problems identified in the Task Force Report, together with the DOC's recommendations.' Two of the DOC's recommendations have been acted upon. The first of these recommendations to be acted upon involved legislation which would facilitate self-insurance by the industry as an alternative to currently

available insurance, and would thus be a possible antidote to inadequate rate-making procedures

A bill styled the Product Lia-

bility Risk Retention Act of 1979' progressed as far as receipt of
overwhelming approval by the House of Representatives,' but died
in the Senate as the 96th Congress adjourned. 1
The other DOC recommendation to be acted upon was preparation of the UPLA. 2 A draft law was published January 12, 1979,"
and a final version was published October 31, 1979."' Various
provisions of the UPLA have served as the basis of legislation
adopted in Connecticut" and Idaho" and introduced in the United
States House of Representatives.'

ITAsK
T

DEPT.

FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-21-1-31.
OF COMM.,

OPTIONS

PAPER ON PRODUCT

LIABILITY AND

ACCIDENT

COMPENSATION ISSUES, 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 (1978) [hereinafter cited as OPTIONS
PAPER].
' See OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 7, at 14,620-21 (discussion of option); id. at
14,625 (DOC recommendation); id. at 14,627-32 (draft of proposed bill to
amend the Internal Revenue Code to provide for deductibility of amounts paid
to captive insurers).
'H.R. 6152, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
"oSee [Dec. 19, 1980], 8 PROD. SAFETY AND LIABILITY REP. (BNA) 904, reporting that the bill is likely to succeed in the 97th Congress.
"Id.
"OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 7 at 14,617 (discussion of option); id. at 14,624
(DOC recommendation). After publication of the Options Paper, the Administration directed the preparation of a draft law. See DEPT. OF COMM., SYNTHESIS
OF PUBLIC COMMENT ON OPTIONS PAPER, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,438, 40,448 (1978)
(Appendix A).
"3 DEPT. OF COMM., DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW, 44 Fed. Reg.
2996 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT UPLL].
14 See note 1 supra.
is COnn. Publ. Act 79-483, Laws 1979 (App. Pamph. 1979). See discussion
in note 44 infra.
"6IDAHO CODE § 6-1401-09 (1980). See discussion note 44 infra.
'7 Foremost among the House bills is H.R. 7921, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980),
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INTRODUCTION
SOME CRITICAL COMMENTS

The goal of the drafters of the UPLA was to bring certainty to

product liability law as one way of alleviating industry's insurance
problems."8 Whether or not this goal will be achieved is presently
a matter of speculation."9 It is clear, however, that this quest for
certainty has resulted in a law which may substantially reduce the
protection of those injured by defective products. The reason for
this is that the drafters have sought to attain certainty by replacing the common law's delicate case-by-case balancing of the rights
of injured plaintiffs and product sellers with rigid categories of

liability and nonliability. Such an approach does not permit sophisticated application by the courts of the policies underlying
product liability. A few examples will serve to illustrate this point.
First, the UPLA eliminates consumer expectations as a criterion
for defectiveness."° This has been done because consumer expectations are deemed to be too "abstract" and because consumers are
said to be incapable of evaluating design decisions. 1
As a result of this drafting decision, the UPLA would leave the
courts without a crucial factor in determining defectiveness." As
an example of the consumer's plight under the UPLA, suppose
injury results when a truck hits a rock in the road and a wheel
which was introduced by Rep. Richardson Preyer after debate on UPLA-type
legislation by the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. See [Aug. 8 ,1980] 8 PROD.
SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. (BNA) 570.
1' Model product liability legislation was discussed in the Options Paper as
a way of dealing with the problem of "uncertainties in the tort-litigation system."
See 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612, 14,616 and references in note 12 supra. The Administration ordered preparation of the law "to attack uncertainties in the tort system."
SYNTHESIS OF PUBLIC COMMENT ON OPTIONS PAPER, supra note

12 at 40,448

(Appendix B). The introduction to the UPLA states: 'The Model Law, if enacted
by the states, would introduce uniformity and stability into the law of product
liability. This, in turn, would help stabilize product liability insurance rates." 44
Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
"See discussion at notes 43-50 infra.
"'See 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (1979)

(analysis of § 104).

"1Id. For a discussion of the arguments favoring the UPLA approach, see

Comment, Model Uniform Product Liability Act-Basic Standards of Responsibility for Manufacturers, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 389 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Basic Standards].
For a comprehensive study of the role of product portrayal in the law of
product liability, see Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L.
REV. 1109 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Shapo].
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separates." The truck was represented to be "Ford-tough" and
was shown in advertisements overcoming great adversity. If the
consumer drove the vehicle to his injury or death following the
collision with the rock because he reasonably believed it was
tough enough to withstand the rock, a strong argument could be
made that the plaintiff ought to recover. The seller has deliberately
created expectations which led to the buyer's injury and should,
therefore, be held responsible. There is reason to believe that this
result would be reached under current law. 4
Under the UPLA, however, the plaintiff in the wheel case would
face severe obstacles to recovery. Under a design defect theory,
the manufacturer's duty would be measured merely against what
constitutes the "reasonable" truck, with all of its design compromises,25 rather than what the manufacturer seemed to be saying

it could produce. Nor could the plaintiff in the above example
rely on an express warranty under the UPLA, since that rigidly

defined category of liability "does not include a general opinion
about, or praise of, the product."2
The arguments given by the drafters of the UPLA in support of

I This hypothetical is similar to the fact situation in Heaton v. Ford Motor
Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967). That case is discussed from a representational perspective in Shapo, supra note 22 at 1149-50.
'See Shapo, supra note 22 at 1199-1202, and cases discussed therein. In
Heaton liability was denied. The majority opinion recognized that products "should
be strong enough to perform as the ordinary consumer expects," Heaton v. Ford
Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 474, 435 P.2d 806, 809, but held that there was insufficient evidence to permit the jury to decide that point. There was a strong
dissent by Justice O'Connell. It is likely that if the Oregon court had been presented with the additional facts in the hypothetical with respect to product advertising, the case would have been decided differently. But see Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) (rejecting consumer expectations test).
144 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979). This determination would be made
primarily under § 104, which requires consideration of whether "the product
was unreasonably unsafe in design," and sets forth five criteria, including "the
technological and practical feasibility" of an alternative design. Id. This basic
determination is subject to 5 106, id. at 62,727, which exempts from liability
"unavoidably dangerous aspects of products," 5 107, id. at 62,728-729, which
provides for consideration by the trier of fact of compliance with industry custom and exempts from liability products which could not be improved "within
practical technological feasibility," and S 108, id. at 62,730, which provides for
presumptions in favor of the seller with respect to products complying with
government regulations.
" UPLA § 104(D). See analysis of this section, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,726
(1979),
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ignoring consumer expectations do not justify denial of recovery
in cases like these. That consumer expectations may be vague or
unrealistic in some cases does not justify ignoring them in all
cases."7 Of course, retaining consumer expectations even as a factor
in determining defectiveness would reduce "certainty" to some
extent. But the alternative offered by the UPLA achieves certainty
at the expense of unduly reducing the protection of injured consumers.
A second example of the problems created by the neat categories of the UPLA is the provision which eliminates a duty to
warn as to "obvious" dangers."8 The drafters feared that an unlimited duty to warn about obvious dangers would reduce the
effectiveness of warnings." This problem could have been dealt
with, however, by making the obviousness of the danger a criterion
for the duty to warn rather than by creating a sweeping exclusion
for all obvious dangers. The UPLA's categorical exemption is
an invitation to the courts to deny liability whenever a danger lies
partially on the surface even if, in view of the consumer's inability
to appreciate the full extent of the danger, a warning should be
required."0 For example, the pop of a champagne cork may be
said to be an "obvious" danger and therefore one of which no
warning is required under the UPLA. The typical consumer, however, whose knowledge of the good life may be based on visions
of a suave William Powell opening champagne in a "Thin Man"
movie, may not be aware of the potential shotgun-like force of a
champagne cork and so may be well served by simple advice from
the bottler to hold the bottle away from him when opening it."
Finally, the drafters of the UPLA have sought certainty by defining certain categories of plaintiff's conduct which will result in
apportionment of damages, including failure to observe an appar27

-A

See Twerski and Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law

Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 230-33 (1978).
28UPLA

29

§ 104(C)(4).

44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,725 (1979)

(Analysis of § 104(C) (4)).

m See Basic Standards, supra note 21 at 413. For a general criticism of the
"obvious danger" rule, see Marshall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make A
Right: Manufacturer's Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L.

1065 (1973).
See Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc., 86 Cal. App. 3d 768, 150 Cal. Rptr.
419 (1979).
REV.
1
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ent defective condition,' use of a product with a known defective
condition3 and misuse.' As is discussed in one of the following
papers,' there has been a growing recognition that, contrary

to the general principle of comparative fault, product manufacturers, because of their greater ability to avoid a product injury,
should sometimes bear the entire responsibility for the injury despite
the plaintiff's negligence. The problem with the UPLA's categories
of plaintiff's conduct is that the use of the categories would result

in the apportionment of damages in many situations in which,
from a policy standpoint, there should be no apportionment. A
buyer who uses an apparently defective product may justifiably
be relying on the seller to have produced a safe product."' The

buyer's unreasonable use of a product with a known danger may
be one which is easily prevented by the manufacturer through,
for example, the installation of two-handed controls which keep
an employee's hands out of moving works. 7 Finally, use of a product which is not "expected of an ordinary reasonably prudent
person who is likely to use the product in the same or similar
circumstances" 8 may still properly be the sole responsibility of the

seller. For example, an "ordinary reasonably prudent person" is
not "expected" to drive twice the speed limit, but damages argu-

ably should not be apportioned if the car breaks down at a speed
which is within the car's anticipated maximum.'
3

2UPLA § 112(A) (2).
-'Id.S 112(B)(1).
-Id. S 112(C).
"See Comment, Examining the Plaintiff's Conduct under the New Model
Uniform Product Liability Act, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 419 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Examining Plaintiff's Conduct].
"See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 27 at 249. See also the discussion of
this section in Examining Plaintiff's Conduct, supra note 35 at 445.
3See Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281
(1972) (denying liability under these facts). Bexiga is discussed in Marschall,
supra note 30 at 1087-88 and in Walkowiak, Reconsidering Plaintiff's Fault in
Product Liability Litigation: The Proposed Conscious Design Choice Exception,
33 VAND. L. REV. 651, 670 (1980). See also the discussion of this section in
Examining Plaintiff's Conduct, supra note 35 at 435.
-UPLA S 112(C)(1) (definition of "misuse").
"See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 27 at 253-54; Twerski, The Use and
Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. REV. 797,
816-17 (1977). See also the discussion of this section in Examining Plaintiff's
Conduct, supra note 35 at 440. It should be pointed out that, although the Draft
UPLL did not provide for apportionment of foreseeable misuse, S 111(C) (3)
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The problems of the UPLA might be tolerable if they were
necessary. The background of the law, however, suggests they were
not. The manufacturers' insurance problems may have required attention, but not such a radical change in tort law. The Task Force
Report pointed out that a large measure of responsibility belonged
to the insurers and their rate-making practices."0 It may well be that
all that is needed are changes in how risks are insured rather than
changes in the risks themselves." At the very least, measures like
the Risk Retention Act' should be given a chance to work before
tampering with the delicate mechanism of tort law.

A

NOTE ON THE FUTURE OF THE

UPLA

All of the alarms sounded above may prove premature in light
of the most likely predictions for the future of the UPLA. In the
first place, the Act has not yet swept the country. The smoke of
discussion has far exceeded the fire of enactment." Even where
the UPLA has inspired state legislation, the resulting legislation
is quite different from the UPLA in its present form." If the fuand the analysis of the present S 112(C) assume that only foreseeable misuse is
apportioned under the Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,738 (1979), the language
of the provision does permit apportionment even of some foreseeable misuse,
such as that involved in the example given in the text. UPLA §§ 111(C) (3) &

112(C).
4'The Task Force Report pointed out that the rise in insurance rates did not
correspond with a rise either in the average size of verdicts or in the number
of pending claims; that insurance companies did not rely on claims data to
support increases in premiums; that although insurers lost money on product
liability insurance in the 1971-74 period, these losses are attributable in large
part to amounts set aside in reserves; that the increases in product liability
premiums were caused in part by the bear market during 1973-74; and that insurers engaged in "panic pricing." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2 at 1-22-1-24.
41 See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 27 at 257. This consdieration was
given some weight by the Governor of Kansas in his message to the legislature
in connection with the veto of a bill modeled on the UPLA. See [Apr. 24, 1980]
8 PROD. SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. (BNA) 317.
'See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
'See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
"Neither the Idaho statute, IDAHO CODE S 6-1401-09 (1980), nor the Connecticut statute, 1979 CONN. PuB. AcTS 79-483, is nearly as comprehensive as
the UPLA. Neither statute, for example, sets forth any of the standards of
manufacturer responsibility which are such an important part of the UPLA.
Other differences include (1) the Connecticut adoption of comparative responsibility, 1979 CoN. PuB. AcTs 70-483, § 4, see notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text; (2) the Idaho adoption of a "not as great as" form of comparative
negligence as compared with the pure form in the UPLA, IDAHO CODE § 6-1404
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ture of the UPLA is in the states, its history to date would suggest
that it is highly unlikely that it will achieve anything like the
uniformity which has been brought to commercial law by the Uniform Commercial Code.
It may be that the UPLA will be nothing more than a benign
influence on what has been to date a "decidedly anti-consumer"'
crop of state product liability laws. For example, Utah imposes
an absolute bar on suits ten years after manufactured and South
Dakota bars suits six years after the first delivery of the product.'
By comparison, the UPLA merely imposes a rebuttable presumption against liability ten years after delivery,' and this provision
was enacted in Idaho's UPLA-inspired law.' Even if the UPLA
becomes federal law, and does, therefore, achieve uniformity, the
vicissitudes of the process are such that it is far too early to hazard
a guess as to what form the law will take.
Finally, even if the UPLA does become general law in something like its present form, it is questionable how much change it
will actually produce. Many of the provisions of the Act, including
all of those discussed above, are drafted with the kind of openended language which permits the courts to continue the development of the law of products liability the Act was intended to frustrate. Thus, consumer expectations may merge as a sub rosa criterion of defectiveness, and "obvious," "apparent," and other terms
defining plaintiffs' and defendants' standards of conduct may be
interpreted so that the courts may impose on sellers the full measure of responsibility advocated above. In short, the guerrilla
forces of tort law may continue their midnight forays against unsafe products despite the establishment of the legislative junta.
Some years ago it was suggested humorously that, from the
(1980), UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABnITY ACT § 111; and (3) Connecticut's absolute
limitation on punitive damages as compared with the more flexible approach of
the UPLA, 1979 CONN. PuB. ACTs 79-483,

§

8, UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY

ACT § 120.

45 OPTIONS PAPER, 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612, 14,613 (1978). For a summary of
§ 16C
(1979).
4UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1953).
47
S.D. COMp. LAws ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (1980 Supp.).
"8UPLA § 110(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,735 (1979).

this legislation, see 2A FRIEDMAN AND FRUMER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY

4

'IDAHO CODE § 6-1403 (1980).
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standpoint of the product manufacturer viewing product liability
law, "the most malign forces imaginable have been at work in
this country.""z Despite the efforts of the drafters of the UPLA,
these "malign forces" may continue to flourish.

-1 Parker, The Most Outrageous Consequences, in THE JUDICIAL
12 (W. Prosser ed. 1900).
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